Bush rischia di passare alla storia per avere decretato con la sua sporca guerra la fine della presenza dei cristiani in Iraq dopo 2000 anni .
Da asianews : http://www.asianews.it/view.php?l=it&art=7489

Yusuf

Beh, anche la menopausa non scherza, vedo....

Non vorrei creare scompiglio durante una sì dotta discussione, ma sono atterrita: il "nostro" Blondette il 13/10 ha smesso temporaneamente i panni di imam teocratico e ha dato l'addio al suo leader (libberale e libberista) mancato (un complotto sinistro!), digrignando i denti ma col moccio al naso e un berluscone in un occhio...
Mi convinco sempre più che i sintomi precoci dell'involuzione senile non siano poi così sfumati.
(Andropausa, andropausa, quante infamie si compiono in tuo nome!)

...e qui

troops are already described by militant propagandists as 'Crusaders'.

According to Dannatt, it is 'the moral and spiritual vacuum' in Britain that has allowed Islamic extremism to flourish. The general, who married a year after leaving university, clearly believes that there is a whiff of decadence about our modern society that discipline, religious observance and 'courage, loyalty, integrity, respect for others' - the very values that are incarnated by the army - would set right.

Some joke about Dannatt's muscular faith - 'Someone's got to be president of the Soldiers' and Airmen's Scripture Readers' Association of course, though perhaps you don't necessarily have to enjoy it quite as much as Richard does,' said one retired senior officer - but others are more wary, asking whether the timing of such intrinsically political statements is ideal.

Almost every incoming CGS has his fingers burned by the media and the new incumbent will have learnt his lesson. But the fact that this modern, professional Christian soldier spoke with the authentic voice of the British army is undeniable. The old adage that you only start worrying when soldiers stop moaning will be scant consolation to the Prime Minister this weekend.

The Dannatt lowdown

Born December 23, 1950. Educated at minor independent Felsted School, Essex. Married Philippa, a fellow Durham university undergraduate, in 1977, a year after graduating. Three sons - one, Bertie, in the Grenadier Guards - and one daughter.

Best of times The 'ritual' family holiday in Cornwall in August. Cricket, rugby, shooting, fishing, skiing.

Worst of times Winning the Military Cross as a platoon commander with the Green Howards in Northern Ireland in 1973 less than a year after passing out from Sandhurst - an episode that the general never talks about.

What he says 'I am not a maverick... I am a soldier speaking up for his army... Honesty is what it is about. The truth will out. We have to speak the truth. Leaking and spinning, at the end of the day, are not helpful.'

What others say 'It is not acceptable really that generals intervene in this way in political matters. I think it has probably been naivety. I think it has probably been a mistake, but it has been quite a serious one.'
Lord Guthrie, Chief of the Defence Staff from 1997 to 2001

Mi scuso per l'errore: ho ripetuto il messaggio precedente. Il ritratto di Sir Richard è qui.


Observer profile: Richard Dannatt


The no-nonsense Christian soldier

As a military man, he is decorated and admired, and his commitment to his
troops is evident. But has the Chief of the General Staff, driven by a
strong religious faith, gone too far in questioning government policy in
Iraq?

Jason Burke
Sunday October 15, 2006
The Observer


Is it really possible that General Sir Richard Dannatt had little idea of
the tumult that his comments recommending a rapid withdrawal of British
troops in Iraq last week would unleash? Despite claims that the Chief of
the General Staff - Britain's most senior serving soldier - must have
calculated the effect of what he said, aides say he was profoundly
surprised by the 'hoo-ha' as he called it that his interview with the
Daily Mail caused. His tone in the interview, say friends and colleagues,
reflected the man: straightforward, earnest, serious, a senior officer who
knows the facts and is not afraid to state them, bluntly if necessary, to
his political masters, to inquisitive journalists, to his own men and to
the British public.
An intellect, if not an intellectual, according to one retired senior
general who knows the new CGS well; a fighter decorated within a year or
so of leaving his Sandhurst; an ambitious soldier who has risen rapidly
through major operational commands; a thinker who took time out of a busy
schedule two weeks ago to attend a lecture on the future of defence in
Europe at the Royal United Services institute, sitting, almost unnoticed,
in the audience like everyone else. A man who, as he says, would never
send a soldier where he would not go himself.
For Dannatt, the interview, given with the assent of his political bosses,
was meant to mark his arrival in the top position in a sensible,
no-nonsense way, to do away with 'spin'. 'If there is one thing he cannot
abide it is blustering or bullshit,' said one former subordinate. The
interview was, everyone insists, not a bid to spark a political row.
But no amount of backtracking and finessing can mask a major embarrassment
for Tony Blair's government, so committed to the ongoing military
interventions in Iraq and Afghanistan, both of which are proving
considerably more complicated than anyone - at least those in power - ever
bargained for. The army, despite occasional scandals, maintains its
position in British public life as one of the few institutions with
genuine authority and genuine respect.
While the reputation of the intelligence services has been badly tarnished
by successive failures to either gather or disseminate accurate
information, the army has emerged from the chaos of Iraq and mismanagement
of Afghanistan with its professional and moral credibility, justifiably,
intact. We like our soldiers in Britain, and when they criticise
politicians we like them even more.
Dannatt's statements are astonishingly honest for a man in his position.
His most high-profile predecessor, the charismatic, unpredictable,
brilliant Sir Michael Jackson, was a master at the political game. Dannatt
appears to be almost deliberately looking to establish a rather different
role.
'He's very much in the old-fashioned officer mode,' says General Sir
Patrick Cordingley, the former Desert Rats commander. 'He believes his job
is to look after his soldiers, to bring missions to a successful close and
to pass on the army to his successor in good condition.' His leisure
choices are also distinctly traditional, centring on a love of sport,
particularly when holidaying with his family in Cornwall, and practising
his strong Christian faith.
With the efficient and practical intelligence for which he is known,
Dannatt has united these three objectives. With motivated, well-equipped
men, he believes, he can fulfil the tasks given to him by his political
masters without running Britain's military machine into the ground. So,
less than two weeks into his new job, the general had already warned of
over-commitment. 'We are running hot,' he said. 'Can we cope? I pause. I
say, "Just."'
Two other key issues - soldiers' pay and their treatment in civilian
hospitals in the UK if wounded - topped his agenda. After a trip to
Afghanistan, he told the government that a monthly salary of £1,100 was
not a fair recompense for weeks spent among heat, flies and Taliban
mortars in Helmand province and won a tax-free bonus for his men. Sir Tim
Garden, a former Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff, points out that
such issues are as politicised as the general's controversial statement
that British troops in Iraq were as much part of the security problem as
the solution to it.
'The chief of staff has always had a dual role,' says Garden. 'He is the
chief shop steward for the nation's armed forces, but also the elected
government's top soldier.'
Dannatt's message is clear. If his troops have what they need - and
Dannatt has repeatedly referred to the respective size of the government
spend on social services (29 per cent) and on defence (5 per cent) - they
will happily fulfil the undoubtedly heavy demands this government's
foreign policy is making on them. If they are not, then that government
can expect problems.
Dannatt is reflecting the views of the vast bulk of Britain's soldiers.
Almost all serving men are happy to go to war if they believe they have
what they need to do the job - and they have the nation behind them.
Parachute Regiment soldiers returning from their recent deployment in
southern Afghanistan - where they have taken not insignificant casualties
by today's standards - complain not about conditions or being sent there
in the first place but about not having enough air support.
They are also angered by a lack of basic intelligence. 'Someone somewhere
down the line f**cked up, and it wasn't us. We were well-prepared, but not
for the right war,' said one. In Iraq, soldiers in Basra are pleased that
the top brass is telling the government what the situation is in clear and
simple language. 'Finally someone senior is telling them exactly what the
situation is,' said one email received from a soldier in the theatre last
week. 'I'm sick of hearing all the rubbish that is spouted by the
politicians.'
More broadly, Dannatt's comments about the Iraq conflict fuelling
extremism around the world, about naive, over-optimistic and sloppy
planning for the aftermath of the war and about unrealistic expectations
that Iraq would become a shining 'exemplar' of liberal democracy in the
Middle East reflect the conventional wisdom among Britain's soldiers,
senior and junior, voiced again and again on the ground and privately in
the UK. Again, they like it when they hear someone in authority saying it
public.
This is partly because soldiers are desperate to keep the nation's
support. This year, senior officers in Afghanistan insisted that 'public
opinion' was a key element of their overall strategy. That included hearts
and minds locally, of course, but it was clear that they really wanted to
keep 'Britain' behind 'our boys'. Dannatt described the war in Iraq as
'unpopular' and that in Afghanistan as 'misunderstood'. One officer,
recently returned from Iraq drily commented: 'That's the least he could
say.'
Yet, the CGS's view of the role of the army and its relation with the
public goes way beyond the exigencies of any particular operation. For
Dannatt, the army is representative of, and a key component of, British
society, reflecting its values and, hopefully, reinforcing its better
ones. There is, according to Dannatt, a 'military covenant' between a
nation and its armed forces. And it is here that he is straying on to
heavily mined ground.
His use of religious terminology to describe the relationship between the
military and the larger population is revealing. His vision of the nation
outlined in the Daily Mail interview is conservative and Christian. 'It is
said we live in a post-Christian society. I think that is a great shame,'
he said, a statement not entirely in accord with the multicultural image
the army has sought to project domestically in recent years or one that
will particularly help soldiers on the ground in Muslim countries such as
Iraq or Afghanistan, where western...

Un ritratto di Sir Richard Dannatt, che a occhio e croce non sembra un pericoloso sovversivo.


How army chief staged No 10 ambush

General Sir Richard Dannatt, new head of the army, knew what he was doing
when he lit the touchpaper during an interview with a concerned mother.
Mark Townsend and Ned Temko examine what happened next

Sunday October 15, 2006
The Observer


It was agreed. No politics, no talk of body bags or rifles that jammed in
the desert. In short, nothing contentious. The assumption was that Sarah
Sands, feature writer for the Daily Mail, would produce a gentle profile
of Sir Richard Dannatt. She would soften his edges, inject a little
pizzazz into the image of the battle-hardened head of the British army.
The interview went well, Sands being particularly impressed with Dannatt's
commitment to the welfare of his soldiers. By the time she left his
third-floor office the writer was content not just professionally but
personally; her son who serves in the army appeared to be in the safest of
hands.
Defence secretary Des Browne had only sanctioned the meeting on the
understanding - by both sides - 'that it would be strictly on military
issues, not politics'. While the former Sunday Telegraph editor may have
understood the message, Dannatt appeared to have his own interpretation of
the instruction. Towards the end of their 90-minute chat the general
seemed only too keen to drag the conversation into uncharted territory. It
was the journalistic equivalent of gelignite.
Perhaps, some speculated, the chief of the general staff had been dazzled
by Sands's breezy, disarming manner. But the truth is that the 55-year-old
general, described by colleagues as a cautious, cerebral character, knew
what he was doing when he shattered the rule of silence that had concealed
the concerns of his predecessors. Dannatt had seen first hand how Iraq was
draining the spirit of his men. He had listened to troops who wondered how
many more of their peers would die in a conflict that seemed to be getting
worse by the day.
The general would tell Sands that British troops should be brought home
'soon' from Iraq and that their presence was 'exacerbating' tensions. Not
only that, but he, in effect, accused the Prime Minister of being 'naive'
in thinking they could install a liberal democracy in Iraq. Within hours
of her dramatic story appearing in print, Browne rang Dannatt to demand if
his comments were accurately replicated. They were. Tony Blair was in
trouble.
At 11.58pm Downing Street was forced to issue a statement saying that
British troops were supported by the democratically elected Iraqi
government. Across the Atlantic, the White House was in a state of
apoplexy. Before the day was out, what had begun as a soft newspaper
spread on a soldier had created a transatlantic rumpus. The most public
chasm between the military and government in recent memory had once again
entangled Blair in that most caustic of subjects: Iraq.
They traipsed into the Ministry of Defence with a more sluggish stride
than usual on Friday morning. The news across Sky and the BBC was about
the army chief's comments. On the third floor, Dannatt's colleagues were
uncertain whether to offer words of support for their boss's forthright
comments or to lie low. Discretion won out.
A Downing Street damage-limitation exercise had seen Dannatt endure a
14-minute radio interview on Radio 4's Today programme. Designed to play
down his comments to Sands, the general actually chose to go one step
further. Dannatt suggested Iraq might ultimately 'break' his beloved
British army. 'I want an army in five years' time,' he said quietly to the
nation.
By the time the general reached his office, the atmosphere on the
third-floor was as tense as a field headquarters before battle. Any doubt
of the seismic repercussions of his remarks vanished with a phone call
from the US embassy.
'As you Brits say: "What the fuck is going on?"' hissed the diplomat. The
Pentagon seemed baffled and bruised in equal measure. Days before, US
military chiefs had suggested that current troop levels in Iraq would have
to remain for the best part of a decade. Downing Street was incandescent,
a dismal week had reached a desperate outcome. The first Prime Minister's
Questions of the parliamentary year, the day after Sands met Dannatt, had
seen Blair's famed surefootedness suddenly desert him.
Could, asked some critics, the attention given by the morning papers to
indications that the death toll in Iraq following the US-led invasion had
topped 655,000, have been part of what rattled Blair? Such concerns had
been overtaken by Friday. What should have been a historic announcement by
the Prime Minister on a roadmap to restoring devolution to Northern
Ireland had been hijacked by a row over a distant country mired in an
ever-bloodier conflict.
By now, the public controversy had made its way to Washington. Challenged
by a reporter at his White House briefing, George Bush's spokesman claimed
that Dannatt had been taken out of context. 'He was misquoted?' prompted a
journalist.
'Yes, that's what he says,' retorted the president's aide.
In Whitehall, amid suggestions the White House and the Prime Minister had
intervened, Dannatt issued a statement reminding anyone who needed
reminding that he was no politician. 'I'm a soldier - we don't do
surrender. We will remain in southern Iraq until the job is done.' It was
too little too late.
Yet the row came so close to never happening. Dannatt was initially
advised not to do the Sands interview but pressed for permission to do so.
Sensing the new army chief might prove a tad too candid for Downing
Street's liking, Whitehall had rejected calls from most journalists to
interview Dannatt, particularly those considered too aggressive.
The request from Sands seemed one of the least exacting they had received.
Eventually the go-ahead was given, around 10 days ago. 'There was a
rolling programme of interviews and this seemed more soft-edged than
most,' said a defence source.
Those soft edges would become razor sharp, leaving Blair little option but
to claim last Friday that he agreed with 'every' word Dannatt had told
Radio 4 in his interview. That meant that the Prime Minister actually
believed the presence of British troops was exacerbating the violence in
parts of Iraq; that the army risked being broken by the conflict and that
the whole debate over withdrawal was not really news. Not even Blair's
most trusted lieutenants thought that Blair believed that.
There was, however, a tangible lift in the body language of the British
soldiers swapping banter in the mess tents of Basra and Lashkar Gar,
Afghanistan. Those enduring the searing heat and danger of the desert
battlefields celebrated a boss who talked the way they thought.
Soldiers have traditionally shared a deep mistrust of politicians, but the
quagmire of Iraq and equipment shortages in Helmand province had
strengthened such suspicions to naked hostility.
A poll on an army website asking users whether Dannatt's comments were
right or wrong offers corroboration. By midday yesterday, 97 per cent
believed their general was right or practically right with his assessment.
No one deemed him wrong. The tone of the entries ranged widely, but the
message was unmistakable.
'Thank God - some genuine leadership based on reality,' said one about
their leader. Another added: 'It's about time someone with a high rank
told him [Blair] a few home truths.' And another: 'It's great that a
senior soldier of this army has finally found the balls to speak out at
the highest level about this issue.'
If politicians are viewed with automatic suspicion by many soldiers, the
media are seen as not much better. Some blogs accused the press of having
taken Dannatt's comments out of context. But the general's colleagues
privately doubted this.
Yes, they said, he appeared to have betrayed an astonishing lack of media
savvy - he had, after all, told Today that his comments were simply not
newsworthy. But, as one defence source added: 'We all asked ourselves: Was
he stupid? Or did he mean to say what he said? He does not have a record
of being stupid.'
Military sources feel certain his remarks were motivated purely by the
welfare of his soldiers. This week, the MoD will continue its inquest into...

Sull'intervento pubblico in merito alla guerra contro l'Irak del Capo di Stato Maggiore britannico, sir Richard Dannatt.
Si noti che dopo un intervento di censura alla politica governativa che non ha precedenti storici moderni in Gran Bretagna, Sir Richard non è stato costretto alle dimissioni; il che fa pensare che dietro di sè abbia, oltre all'esercito, la famiglia reale e la chiesa anglicana.

How army chief staged No 10 ambush

General Sir Richard Dannatt, new head of the army, knew what he was doing
when he lit the touchpaper during an interview with a concerned mother.
Mark Townsend and Ned Temko examine what happened next

Sunday October 15, 2006
The Observer


It was agreed. No politics, no talk of body bags or rifles that jammed in
the desert. In short, nothing contentious. The assumption was that Sarah
Sands, feature writer for the Daily Mail, would produce a gentle profile
of Sir Richard Dannatt. She would soften his edges, inject a little
pizzazz into the image of the battle-hardened head of the British army.
The interview went well, Sands being particularly impressed with Dannatt's
commitment to the welfare of his soldiers. By the time she left his
third-floor office the writer was content not just professionally but
personally; her son who serves in the army appeared to be in the safest of
hands.
Defence secretary Des Browne had only sanctioned the meeting on the
understanding - by both sides - 'that it would be strictly on military
issues, not politics'. While the former Sunday Telegraph editor may have
understood the message, Dannatt appeared to have his own interpretation of
the instruction. Towards the end of their 90-minute chat the general
seemed only too keen to drag the conversation into uncharted territory. It
was the journalistic equivalent of gelignite.
Perhaps, some speculated, the chief of the general staff had been dazzled
by Sands's breezy, disarming manner. But the truth is that the 55-year-old
general, described by colleagues as a cautious, cerebral character, knew
what he was doing when he shattered the rule of silence that had concealed
the concerns of his predecessors. Dannatt had seen first hand how Iraq was
draining the spirit of his men. He had listened to troops who wondered how
many more of their peers would die in a conflict that seemed to be getting
worse by the day.
The general would tell Sands that British troops should be brought home
'soon' from Iraq and that their presence was 'exacerbating' tensions. Not
only that, but he, in effect, accused the Prime Minister of being 'naive'
in thinking they could install a liberal democracy in Iraq. Within hours
of her dramatic story appearing in print, Browne rang Dannatt to demand if
his comments were accurately replicated. They were. Tony Blair was in
trouble.
At 11.58pm Downing Street was forced to issue a statement saying that
British troops were supported by the democratically elected Iraqi
government. Across the Atlantic, the White House was in a state of
apoplexy. Before the day was out, what had begun as a soft newspaper
spread on a soldier had created a transatlantic rumpus. The most public
chasm between the military and government in recent memory had once again
entangled Blair in that most caustic of subjects: Iraq.
They traipsed into the Ministry of Defence with a more sluggish stride
than usual on Friday morning. The news across Sky and the BBC was about
the army chief's comments. On the third floor, Dannatt's colleagues were
uncertain whether to offer words of support for their boss's forthright
comments or to lie low. Discretion won out.
A Downing Street damage-limitation exercise had seen Dannatt endure a
14-minute radio interview on Radio 4's Today programme. Designed to play
down his comments to Sands, the general actually chose to go one step
further. Dannatt suggested Iraq might ultimately 'break' his beloved
British army. 'I want an army in five years' time,' he said quietly to the
nation.
By the time the general reached his office, the atmosphere on the
third-floor was as tense as a field headquarters before battle. Any doubt
of the seismic repercussions of his remarks vanished with a phone call
from the US embassy.
'As you Brits say: "What the fuck is going on?"' hissed the diplomat. The
Pentagon seemed baffled and bruised in equal measure. Days before, US
military chiefs had suggested that current troop levels in Iraq would have
to remain for the best part of a decade. Downing Street was incandescent,
a dismal week had reached a desperate outcome. The first Prime Minister's
Questions of the parliamentary year, the day after Sands met Dannatt, had
seen Blair's famed surefootedness suddenly desert him.
Could, asked some critics, the attention given by the morning papers to
indications that the death toll in Iraq following the US-led invasion had
topped 655,000, have been part of what rattled Blair? Such concerns had
been overtaken by Friday. What should have been a historic announcement by
the Prime Minister on a roadmap to restoring devolution to Northern
Ireland had been hijacked by a row over a distant country mired in an
ever-bloodier conflict.
By now, the public controversy had made its way to Washington. Challenged
by a reporter at his White House briefing, George Bush's spokesman claimed
that Dannatt had been taken out of context. 'He was misquoted?' prompted a
journalist.
'Yes, that's what he says,' retorted the president's aide.
In Whitehall, amid suggestions the White House and the Prime Minister had
intervened, Dannatt issued a statement reminding anyone who needed
reminding that he was no politician. 'I'm a soldier - we don't do
surrender. We will remain in southern Iraq until the job is done.' It was
too little too late.
Yet the row came so close to never happening. Dannatt was initially
advised not to do the Sands interview but pressed for permission to do so.
Sensing the new army chief might prove a tad too candid for Downing
Street's liking, Whitehall had rejected calls from most journalists to
interview Dannatt, particularly those considered too aggressive.
The request from Sands seemed one of the least exacting they had received.
Eventually the go-ahead was given, around 10 days ago. 'There was a
rolling programme of interviews and this seemed more soft-edged than
most,' said a defence source.
Those soft edges would become razor sharp, leaving Blair little option but
to claim last Friday that he agreed with 'every' word Dannatt had told
Radio 4 in his interview. That meant that the Prime Minister actually
believed the presence of British troops was exacerbating the violence in
parts of Iraq; that the army risked being broken by the conflict and that
the whole debate over withdrawal was not really news. Not even Blair's
most trusted lieutenants thought that Blair believed that.
There was, however, a tangible lift in the body language of the British
soldiers swapping banter in the mess tents of Basra and Lashkar Gar,
Afghanistan. Those enduring the searing heat and danger of the desert
battlefields celebrated a boss who talked the way they thought.
Soldiers have traditionally shared a deep mistrust of politicians, but the
quagmire of Iraq and equipment shortages in Helmand province had
strengthened such suspicions to naked hostility.
A poll on an army website asking users whether Dannatt's comments were
right or wrong offers corroboration. By midday yesterday, 97 per cent
believed their general was right or practically right with his assessment.
No one deemed him wrong. The tone of the entries ranged widely, but the
message was unmistakable.
'Thank God - some genuine leadership based on reality,' said one about
their leader. Another added: 'It's about time someone with a high rank
told him [Blair] a few home truths.' And another: 'It's great that a
senior soldier of this army has finally found the balls to speak out at
the highest level about this issue.'
If politicians are viewed with automatic suspicion by many soldiers, the
media are seen as not much better. Some blogs accused the press of having
taken Dannatt's comments out of context. But the general's colleagues
privately doubted this.
Yes, they said, he appeared to have betrayed an astonishing lack of media
savvy - he had, after all, told Today that his comments were simply not
newsworthy. But, as one defence source added: 'We all asked...

Lind la pensava così, sulla guerra in Iraq, ancor prima che iniziasse; e il tempo, che con chi sa pensare è galantuomo, gli ha dato ragione:

ON WAR # 1

Can A Government Wage War Without Popular Support?
By William S. Lind
January 28, 2003

Beginning this Tuesday, January 28, 2003, I will offer an "On War" commentary each week until the Iraq business is over and done. I suspect that may be awhile.

Who am I? At present, I am a center director at the Free Congress Foundation. But in 1976 I began the debate over maneuver warfare that became a central part of the military reform movement of the 1970s and 1980s. The U.S. Marine Corps finally adopted maneuver warfare as doctrine in the late `80s (I wrote most of their new tactics manual).

In 1989, I began the debate over Fourth Generation warfare—war waged by non-state entities—which is what paid us a visit on September 11, 2001. The article I co-authored then for the Marine Corps Gazette was formally cited last year by al Quaeda, who said, "This is our doctrine." My Maneuver Warfare Handbook, published in 1985, is now used by military academies all over the world, and I lecture internationally on military strategy, doctrine and tactics.

In this series, I propose to look at what is happening—with Iraq, North Korea, Afghanistan and other outposts of the new American imperium—from the standpoint of military theory. Hopefully, that will enable us all to make sense out of the bits and pieces we get each day as "news." One of the most important things military theory offers to this end is a framework developed by Col. John Boyd, USAF, who was the greatest military theorist America ever produced. Col. Boyd said that war is fought at three levels: moral, mental and physical. The moral level is the most powerful, the physical level is the least powerful, and the mental level is in between. The American way of war, which is Second Generation warfare—there will be more on the Four Generations of Modern War in future commentaries—is physical: "putting steel on target," as our soldiers like to say.

But how does the coming war with Iraq look at the moral level? Here, the U.S. seems to be leading with its chin. Why? Because the Administration in Washington has yet to come up with a convincing rationale for why the United States should attack Iraq.

The argument that Iraq, a small, poor (it didn't used to be, but it is now), Third World country halfway around the world is a direct threat to the U.S.A. is not credible. Yes, Saddam probably has some chemical and biological weapons. But few tyrants are bent on suicide, and the notion that he would use them to attack the United States, except in self-defense, makes no sense. Nor does it seem likely he would give them to non-state actors like al Quaeda—again, except in self-defense—because non-state forces and Fourth Generation warfare are as much a threat to him as to us.

It is of course true that Saddam is a tyrant (his model, by the way, is obviously Stalin, not Hitler). So what? Mesopotamia has been ruled by tyrants since before history began, and it will be ruled by tyrants long after North America is once again tribal territories. The last President who tried to export democracy on American bayonets was Woodrow Wilson. That's one of the reasons he counts as America's worst President, ever. Very few people, in America or the rest of the world, wish to see us revive the practice.

Most importantly, the real threat we face is the Fourth Generation, non-state players such as al Quaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, etc. They can only benefit from an American war against Iraq—regardless of how it turns out. If we win, the state is further discredited in the Islamic world, and more young men give their allegiance to non-state forces. If Saddam wins, their own governments look even less legitimate, because they failed to stand with him against the hated Crusaders. A recent cartoon showed Osama bin Laden, dressed as Uncle Sam, saying, "I want you to invade Iraq!" Undoubtedly, he does.

So what is the real reason for this war? Oil? Revenge for Saddam surviving the first Gulf War? Israel? The ordinary Americans I know are wondering, because the reasons stated by the Administration don't add up.

Military theory says that, in a democracy, a government cannot successfully wage war unless the war has popular support. In turn, a war cannot obtain popular support if the people do no understand why it is being fought. Today, the people, at home and overseas, do not understand why America wants to go to war with Iraq. That means the Administration is losing this war before the first bomb is dropped.


--------------------------------------------------------------------------------

These publications are a service of the Free Congress Research and Education Foundation, Inc. (FCF) and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Free Congress Foundation nor is it an attempt to aid or hinder the passage of any bill. Nor is it an attempt to assist or defeat any candidate running for public office.

William S. Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the Free Congress Foundation.

Contents

DNI Home

Ecco che cosa s'intende per "guerra di quarta generazione".
April 23, 2003
Cultures in Conflict
The Four Generations of Modern War
By WILLIAM S. LIND
Rather than commenting on the specifics of the war with Iraq, I thought it
might be a good time to lay out a framework for understanding that and
other conflicts. The framework is the Four Generations of Modern War.
I developed the framework of the first three generations ("generation" is
shorthand for dialectically qualitative shift) in the 1980s, when I was
laboring to introduce maneuver warfare to the Marine Corps. Marines kept
asking, "What will the Fourth Generation be like?", and I began to think
about that. The result was the article I co-authored for the Marine Corps
Gazette in 1989, "The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation."
Our troops found copies of it in the caves at Tora Bora, the al Quaeda
hideout in Afghanistan.
The Four Generations began with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, the
treaty that ended the Thirty Years' War. With the Treaty of Westphalia,
the state established a monopoly on war. Previously, many different
entities had fought wars -- families, tribes, religions, cities, business
enterprises -- using many different means, not just armies and navies (two
of those means, bribery and assassination, are again in vogue). Now, state
militaries find it difficult to imagine war in any way other than fighting
state armed forces similar to themselves.
The First Generation of Modern War runs roughly from 1648 to 1860. This
was war of line and column tactics, where battles were formal and the
battlefield was orderly. The relevance of the First Generation springs
from the fact that the battlefield of order created a military culture of
order. Most of the things that distinguish "military" from "civilian" -
uniforms, saluting, careful gradations or rank -- were products of the
First Generation and are intended to reinforce the culture of order.
The problem is that, around the middle of the 19th century, the
battlefield of order began to break down. Mass armies, soldiers who
actually wanted to fight (an 18th century's soldier's main objective was
to desert), rifled muskets, then breech loaders and machine guns, made the
old line and column tactics first obsolete, then suicidal.
The problem ever since has been a growing contradiction between the
military culture and the increasing disorderliness of the battlefield. The
culture of order that was once consistent with the environment in which it
operated has become more and more at odds with it.
Second Generation warfare was one answer to this contradiction. Developed
by the French Army during and after World War I, it sought a solution in
mass firepower, most of which was indirect artillery fire. The goal was
attrition, and the doctrine was summed up by the French as, "The artillery
conquers, the infantry occupies." Centrally-controlled firepower was
carefully synchronized, using detailed, specific plans and orders, for the
infantry, tanks, and artillery, in a "conducted battle" where the
commander was in effect the conductor of an orchestra.
Second Generation warfare came as a great relief to soldiers (or at least
their officers) because it preserved the culture of order. The focus was
inward on rules, processes and procedures. Obedience was more important
than initiative (in fact, initiative was not wanted, because it endangered
synchronization), and discipline was top-down and imposed.
Second Generation warfare is relevant to us today because the United
States Army and Marine Corps learned Second Generation warfare from the
French during and after World War I. It remains the American war of war,
as we are seeing in Afghanistan and Iraq: to Americans, war means "putting
steel on target." Aviation has replaced artillery as the source of most
firepower, but otherwise, (and despite the Marine's formal doctrine, which
is Third Generation maneuver warfare) the American military today is as
French as white wine and brie. At the Marine Corps' desert warfare
training center at 29 Palms, California, the only thing missing is the
tricolor and a picture of General Gamelin in the headquarters. The same is
true at the Army's Armor School at Fort Knox, where one instructor
recently began his class by saying, "I don't know why I have to teach you
all this old French crap, but I do."
Third Generation warfare, like Second, was a product of World War I. It
was developed by the German Army, and is commonly known as Blitzkrieg or
maneuver warfare.
Third Generation warfare is based not on firepower and attrition but
speed, surprise, and mental as well as physical dislocation. Tactically,
in the attack a Third Generation military seeks to get into the enemy's
rear and collapse him from the rear forward: instead of "close with and
destroy," the motto is "bypass and collapse." In the defense, it attempts
to draw the enemy in, then cut him off. War ceases to be a shoving
contest, where forces attempt to hold or advance a "line;" Third
Generation warfare is non-linear.
Not only do tactics change in the Third Generation, so does the military
culture. A Third Generation military focuses outward, on the situation,
the enemy, and the result the situation requires, not inward on process
and method (in war games in the 19th Century, German junior officers were
routinely given problems that could only be solved by disobeying orders).
Orders themselves specify the result to be achieved, but never the method
("Auftragstaktik"). Initiative is more important than obedience (mistakes
are tolerated, so long as they come from too much initiative rather than
too little), and it all depends on self-discipline, not imposed
discipline. The Kaiserheer and the Wehrmacht could put on great parades,
but in reality they had broken with the culture of order.
Characteristics such as decentralization and initiative carry over from
the Third to the Fourth Generation, but in other respects the Fourth
Generation marks the most radical change since the Peace of Westphalia in
1648. In Fourth Generation war, the state loses its monopoly on war. All
over the world, state militaries find themselves fighting non-state
opponents such as al Quaeda, Hamas, Hezbollah, and the FARC. Almost
everywhere, the state is losing.
Fourth Generation war is also marked by a return to a world of cultures,
not merely states, in conflict. We now find ourselves facing the Christian
West's oldest and most steadfast opponent, Islam. After about three
centuries on the strategic defensive, following the failure of the second
Turkish siege of Vienna in 1683, Islam has resumed the strategic
offensive, expanding outward in every direction. In Third Generation war,
invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a
state army.
Nor is Fourth Generation warfare merely something we import, as we did on
9/11. At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and
that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation war on
their soil. America, with a closed political system (regardless of which
party wins, the Establishment remains in power and nothing really changes)
and a poisonous ideology of "multiculturalism," is a prime candidate for
the home-grown variety of Fourth Generation war -- which is by far the
most dangerous kind.
Where does the war in Iraq fit in this framework?
I suggest that the war we have seen thus far is merely a powder train
leading to the magazine. The magazine is Fourth Generation war by a wide
variety of Islamic non-state actors, directed at America and Americans
(and local governments friendly to America) everywhere. The longer America
occupies Iraq, the greater the chance that the magazine will explode. If
it does, God help us all.
William S. Lind is Director of the Center for Cultural Conservatism at the
Free Congress Foundation.

William Lind, l'autore di questo articolo comparso su www.counterpunch.org il 12 ottobre, è uno dei principali studiosi di strategia statunitensi; estensore del manuale tattico attualmente in uso nel corpo dei marines; allievo del Col. John Boyd, USAF, il maggiore stratega militare americano di sempre; principale autore del concetto di Fourth Generation War (guerra asimmetrica); chiamato a tenere lezioni presso le Accademie di Annapolis e West Point; capofila teorico del movimento di riforma dell'esercito americano che negli anni '8o portò a una importante ritrutturazione del corpo dei Marines.

October 12, 2006
Political Cynicism and Moral Cowardice
Why Do We Still Fight a Lost War?
By WILLIAM S. LIND
At least 32 American troops have been killed in Iraq this month.
Approximately 300 have been wounded. The "battle for Baghdad" is going
nowhere. A Marine friend just back from Ramadi said to me, "It didn't get
any better while I was there, and it's not going to get better." Virtually
everyone in Washington, except the people in the White House, knows that
is true for all of Iraq.
Actually, I think the White House knows it too. Why then does it insist on
"staying the course" at a casualty rate of more than one thousand
Americans per month? The answer is breathtaking in its cynicism: so the
retreat from Iraq happens on the next President's watch. That is why we
still fight.
Yep, it's now all about George. Anyone who thinks that is too low, too
mean, too despicable even for this bunch does not understand the meaning
of the adjective "Rovian." Would they let thousands more young Americans
get killed or wounded just so George W. does not have to face the
consequences of his own folly? In a heartbeat.
Not that it's going to help. When history finally lifts it leg on the Bush
administration, it will wash all such tricks away, leaving only the hubris
and the incompetence. Jeffrey Hart, who with Russell Kirk gone is probably
the top intellectual in the conservative movement, has already written
that George W. Bush is the worst President America ever had. I think the
honor still belongs to the sainted Woodrow, but if Bush attacks Iran, he
may yet earn the prize. That third and final act in the Bush tragicomedy
is waiting in the wings.
A post-election Democratic House, Senate or both might in theory say no to
another war. But if the Bush administration's cynicism is boundless, the
Democrats' intellectual vacuity and moral cowardice are equally so. You
can't beat something with nothing, but Democrats have put forward nothing
in the way of an alternative to Bush's defense and foreign policies. On
Iran, the question is whether they will be more scared of the Republicans
or of the Israeli lobby. Either way, they will hide under the bed, just as
they have hidden under the bed on the war in Iraq. It appears at the
moment that a Congressional demand for withdrawal from Iraq is more likely
if the Republicans keep the Senate and Senator John Warner of Virginia
remains Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee than if the
Democrats take over.
There is a great deal of material available to the Democrats to offer an
alternative, much of it the product of the Military Reform Movement of the
1970s and 80s. Gary Hart can tell them all about it. There is even a
somewhat graceful way out of Iraq, if the Dems will ask themselves my
favorite foreign policy question, WWBD - - What Would Bismarck Do? He
would transfer sufficient Swiss francs to interested parties so that the
current government of Iraq asks us to leave. They, not we, would then hold
the world's ugliest baby, even though it was America's indiscretion that
gave the bastard birth.
But donkeys will think when pigs fly. A Democratic Congress will be as
stupid, cowardly and corrupt as its Republican predecessor; in reality,
both parties are one party, the party of successful career politicians.
The White House will continue a lost war in Iraq, solely to dump the mess
in the next President's lap. America or Israel will attack Iran, pulling
what's left of the temple down on our heads. Congress will do nothing to
stop either war.
By 2008, I may not be the only monarchist in America.
William S. Lind, expressing his own personal opinion, is Director for the
Center for Cultural Conservatism for the Free Congress Foundation.

Come sono giunti al calcolo di 650.000 morti?
Risponde uno degli autori dello studio statistico.
dal sito www.dedefensa.org (che consiglio di visitare di frequente)
Cordiali saluti. Roberto Buffagni


655.000 morts ? Comment ont-ils calculé cela ?
Date de publication : 13/10/2006 - Rubrique : Bloc-Notes
L’étude d’un groupe de statisticiens de la John Hopkins University sur les
pertes en Irak depuis mars 2003 (655.000 morts) est l’objet d’une intense
polémique. Elle ajoute un élément intensément tragique au discrédit qui
caractérise aujourd’hui la guerre en Irak.
Amy Goodman, de la station de radio Democracy Now !, a reçu hier l’un des
auteurs de cette étude, Les Roberts. Parmi les questions posées, celles qui
concernent la méthodologie employée (avec l’intervention d’un autre
intervieweur, Juan Gonzales).
AMY GOODMAN : It’s good to have you with us. Why don't you lay out exactly what
you found?
LES ROBERTS: Sure, we, as you said, went to about 50 neighborhoods spread around
Iraq that were picked at random, and each time we went, we knocked on 40 doors
and asked people, “Who lived here on the first of January, 2002?” and “Who lived
here today?” And we asked, “Had anyone been born or died in between?” And on
those occasions, when people said someone die, we said, “Well, how did they
die?” And we sort of wrote down the details: when, how old they were, what was
the cause of death. And when it was violence, we asked, “Well, who did the
killing? How exactly did it happen? What kind of weapon was used?” And at the
end of the interview, when no one knew this was coming, we asked most of the
time for a death certificate. And 92% of the time, people walked back into their
houses and could produce a death certificate. So we are quite sure people didn’t
make this up.
And our conclusion was comparing the death rate for that 14 months before the
invasion, with the 40 months after, that the death rate is now about four times
higher. And, in fact, it’s twice as high as when we last spoke two years ago and
when we did our first study. So, things have gotten bad, as you stated. We think
about 650,000 extra people have died because of this invasion, and about
600,000, some 90%, are from violence.
JUAN GONZALEZ: Well, I’m sure you have heard by now the responses of President
Bush and military leaders about this. What is your response to their saying that
this is not credible?
LES ROBERTS: You know, I don't want to sort of stoop to that level and start
saying general slurs, but I just want to say that what we did, this cluster
survey approach, is the standard way of measuring mortality in very poor
countries where the government isn’t very functional or in times of war. And
when UNICEF goes out and measures mortality in any developing country, this is
what they do. When the U.S. government went at the end of the war in Kosovo or
went at the end of the war in Afghanistan and the U.S. government measured the
death rate, this is how they did it. And most ironically, the U.S. government
has been spending millions of dollars per year, through something called the
Smart Initiative, to train NGOs and UN workers to do cluster surveys to measure
mortality in times of wars and disasters.
So, I think we used a very standard method. I think our results are couched
appropriately in the relative imprecision of [inaudible]. It could conceivably
be as few as 400,000 deaths. So we’re upfront about that. We don’t know the
exact number. We just know the range, and we’re very, very confident about both
the method and the results.
(…)
JUAN GONZALEZ: Les Roberts, I would like to ask you something about the
methodology of the study. Clearly in Iraq, as in most wars of this type, the
level of violence is uneven across the country. It might not necessarily even
correspond to the population densities of different areas. What was the
methodology that you used to select the particular clusters that you chose?
LES ROBERTS: Sure. That’s a great question. And you’re right. In Iraq, there is
a huge difference in death rates between, for example, the Kurdish north, which
is relatively safe, and the Sunni Triangle, where the death rates are extremely
high. And what we did was we got a population estimate of every government, from
the Iraqi government, and we randomly allocated these 50 clusters that we were
to go visit proportional to the population in each of those governments, so
that, if in the Kurdish north there is only 20% of the population living in the
couple safest provinces, we would naturally end up with a sample that’s 20% or
so from that zone.
And then, once we had picked that we were going to visit two or three
neighborhoods in a certain governance or province, we would then make a list of
all the villages and towns and cities, and again randomly pick one of those to
visit, so that big places had a larger chance of being visited than smaller
places. And then, finally, when we got down to the village level or to the
section of a city, we would pick a house at random, visit it and the other 39
houses closest to it to grab a cluster of 40 houses. And luckily, in the
analysis, we can sort of look at how much variation there was between clusters.
And when we reported this, we didn’t say it was 655,000 deaths. We said it was
655,000 deaths, and we’re 95% sure it’s between about 400,000 and 950,000. And
that range of imprecision is capturing that variance between neighborhoods that
you described, some places having a lot of violence, and some not. So there is
less than a 2 percent chance that the number is well below 400,000. So, you
know, it’s not precise. It’s incredibly hard to do this kind of work in times of
war, and I think that this is awfully good, given the conditions.


Mis en ligne le 13 octobre 2006 à 08H49
© www.dedefensa.org - Euredit S.P.R.L
22 rue du Centenaire - B-4624 Fléron - Belgique Tél.:+32/4/355.05.50 - Fax:
+32/4/355.08.35.

Magari fossero solo tesi ideologiche. Sarei contentissimo se il numero reale dei morti fosse di meno e se i calcoli statistici fossero sbagliati. (vedi altro articolo http://www.dedefensa.org/article.php?art_id=3258). E sarei super contento se a Falluja avessero gettato petali di rosa anzichè bombe al fosforo.
Ma la realtà è ben altra. Anche i generali cominciano a dire la verità : http://www.effedieffe.com/interventizeta.php?id=1495¶metro=esteri (l'articolo è di Blondet, ma per chi avesse con lui la puzza ideologica al naso non si preoccupi. Sul sito de La Stampa di oggi c'era la stessa notizia e per di più l'autore è il neocon di ferro Maurizio Molinari)

Ismaele

Ma dico, non vorrete veramente prendere sul serio questo pseudo-studio pseudo-scientifico?

Basta leggere come è stato condotto, e come la pensa politicamente il direttore della rivista, per capire che è un insulto alla scienza statistica.
E poi che strane coincidenze: questi studi il Lancet li pubblica sempre in prossimità di una elezione americana. Prima nel 2004, poi adesso... Ma i complottisti in questi casi dormono.

C'è sempre chi si beve tutto in un fiato, se serve a confermare le proprie tesi ideologiche. Pure il "genocidio di Falluja", sì...vabbé, ciao.

In questo interessante articolo si parla addirittura di 650000 morti :
http://anti-war.com/justin/?articleid=9854

Yusuf

Immaginiamo che un criminale tiri una coltellata ad una persona. La ferita va in cancrena e la persona muore. Il criminale viene arrestato e si giustifica dicendo : "Non l'ho ucciso io : sono stati i batteri !" Questo è più o meno il ragionamento logico (?) che usano i neoconsionisti per giustificare il genocidio iracheno perpetrato dagli anglo-americani su commissione israeliana.
Gli americani e gli israeliani sanno che non ci vuole molto per scatenare l'inferno in una società complessa ed in cui regna l'insicurezza sociale (queste due condizioni essendo state create con la creazione del regime di Saddam Hussein, con le due guerre del Golfo Persico, con il sostenere la guerra contro l'Iran, con l'embargo). Del resto negli USA quando vi è un black-out di qualche ora succede di tutto : ma la società americana è molto più fragile, lì basta poco per scatenare l'inferno. Con l'Iraq è stato necessario usare una mano molto, moltissimo , infinitamente più pesante (senza scomodare il genocidio di Falluja cito solo uno dei numerosissimi esempi : leggersi questo articolo : http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Middle_East/GL09Ak03.html).

Yusuf

Sed quae nam ea sit audite, Patres, et benignis auribus pro vestra humanitate hanc mihi operam condonate.

Pico-Bernardo :-)

Pardon, il comento è stato divorato da splindèr:

"Legi, Patres colendissimi, in Arabum monumentis, interrogatum Abdallam sarracenum, quid in hac quasi mundana scena admirandum maxime spectaretur, nihil spectari homine [bernardo?] admirabilius respondisse..." (Ioannis Pici Miran. Oratio, § 1).

"Legi, Patres colendissimi, in Arabum monumentis, interrogatum Abdallam sarracenum, quid in hac quasi mundana scena admirandum maxime spectaretur, nihil spectari homine [>bernardo

Chiedo venia per quel "siamo tutti più soli ora". Suona patetico.

Marco

Oltre 600.000 morti, un paese a pezzi, odio certo per generazioni, il tutto per una guerra menzognera sono un crimine gravissimo. L'altra tragedia è che gli Stati Uniti, paese che un tempo godeva di grande credito morale, lo stanno dilapidando.
Siamo tutti più soli oggi.

Marco

Non si chiama faida interna, caro Bernardino: si chiama democrazia.

No, no, si chiama proprio faida interna, mi creda Norman. :-D

Non si chiama faida interna, caro Bernardino: si chiama democrazia.

Acciderbolina.
Ovviamente Norman "Yusuf" Bates non dice che i morti civili sono caduti in stragrande maggioranza a causa degli attentati kamikaze della faida interna fra sciiti e sunniti, e non si accorge neppure che parlare di "genocidio di feriti" fa un po' ridere (non dei poveri feriti, of course, ma di chi si esprime in questi termini ridicoli solo per il gusto perverso del melodramma scandalistico).
Ed è curioso che Norman "Yusuf" Bates chiami banalizzazioni gli interventi di chi si rifiuta, per amor di ragione, di cantare l'Amamialfredo con lui, la mamma e il drug king Blondette, antisemita e cattofascista.

Bernardo

Rispondendo al post di GdC vorrei far notare tra l'altro che tra i soldati americani i morti sono ufficialmente (e non si sa quanto sia vero) 3.011; ma i feriti americani oltre ventimila. Ora se i morti tra i civili iracheni sono 600000 e se la proporzione è più o meno la stessa i feriti dovrebbero essere tra i 3 milioni e mezzo ed i 4 milioni : su una popolazione di circa 27 milioni di abitanti ! Un vero e proprio genocidio. Voluto e pianificato per esportare la democrazia americana.

Yusuf

Cosa vuole che le dica caro amico ? Sono senza parole di fronte a tale paranoia che sta manifestando. Lei mi pare che aveva altro da fare , giusto ? Questo mi pare un blog serio in cui si discutono cose gravi, importanti e , a parte le sue sbavature, con una certa dialettica. E' veramente un peccato che contribuisca a banalizzare così stupidamente questi temi. Temi importanti che riguardano ciascuno di noi.
A questo punto le consiglio (seriamente, mi creda) una buona psicoterapia : forse la riporterà nella realtà che lei si ostina a rifiutare quale essa è. Perchè prima o poi si ricordi che sarà la realtà stessa a fare i conti con lei.

Yusuf

la situazione resta un inferno ed alcune considerazioni irreali ed ideologicamente deliranti non aggiungono niente di rilevante (a parte profonda tristezza)

Giustissimo, Yusuf. Dunque perché insiste coi suoi melodrammoni stile drug king Blondette, che sono poi un menare il can per l'aia alla disperata ricerca del cuore sanremese dell'italiano medio?
Miei cari Abdallah (a proposito di nomi) moralizzatori del traviato occidente, in un altro film indubbiamente più famoso del precedente, "Psycho", il protagonista, Anthony Perkins, nei panni dello psicopatico Norman Bates, intavolava belle e lunghe discussioni con la madre defunta, della quale aveva assunto l'identità in condominio con la propria.
Norman-mamma: Normaaaaaaan!
Norman-Norman: Arrivo mamma!
Chi ha orecchie...:-)

Bernardo

Caro Ismaele, non so cosa o chi tu conosca dell'Iraq, ma mi hai ricordato un mio carissimo amico curdo che aveva un parente pesh merga (credo tu sappia chi erano) morto in battaglia. Ci conosciamo da una vita e l'ho rivisto recentemente dopo 15 anni .Con tristezza descriveva la drammaticità della situazione attuale (lui è sempre stato contrario sia alla prima che alla seconda guerra del Golfo. Ed in effetti confermava quello che notavi tu : dopo l'invasione degli anglo-americani i confini iracheni sono stati ridotti ad un drammatico colabrodo (e sorvoliamo su tutto il resto).
Un consiglio : non darti pena di replicare a certi interventi. Purtroppo quei 600000 morti restano , la situazione resta un inferno ed alcune considerazioni irreali ed ideologicamente deliranti non aggiungono niente di rilevante (a parte profonda tristezza)

Yusuf

Non capisco che cosa ci sia di male nel mio nome : era il nome anche di mio nonno e nessuno glielo faceva notare , come nessuno (tranne qualche spiacevole eccezione) lo fa notare a me. La situazione dell'Iraq (e gli iracheni : gente meravigliosa che non gradisco sia trattata male) non la conosco da ieri, ma da quasi trent'anni , quando i curdi la gente manco sapeva chi erano e dove si trovavano , e a quel tempo i saccenti giovani commentatori odierni erano ancora all'asilo infantile dove si facevano la cacca addosso. Adesso non più : la cacca la spandono sugli altri.

Ismaele

Che gli americani abbiano perso in Iraq è pacifico solo per delle sinapsi pacificate da precoce senilità. Non intendo comunque perdere tempo nel tentativo di farlo capire a chi non è in grado.
Quanto al bollettino di Ismaele (ahi, Isacco vil razza dannata!) in diretta dall'Armageddon, con tanto di lacrimoso riferimento alla pacifica convivenza coi "fratelli mussulmani", mi pare di paternità tutt'altro che incerta.
Nel film "Anni ruggenti", Gino Cervi, nella parte di un corrotto podestà fascista, portava uno stralunato sedicente gerarca Nino Manfredi in visita agli allevamenti di vacche della zona, facendo spostare gli stessi animali di stalla in stalla per coprire la penuria con una millantata abbondanza. Ecco, le mute di segugi da tartufo del drug king Blondette si "tanano" facilmente, e io, come Nino Manfredi, che proprio fesso non era, mi chiedo: "Ma com'è che in tutte le stalle che abbiamo visitato c'è una vacca spelacchiata e con la con la coda mozza?" :-D
Chi ha orecchie...

Bernardo

654.965 sono i morti civili della guerra in Iraq.
I soldati americani caduti laggiù sono in numero maggiore degli americani uccisi l’11 settembre (tra l'altro l'Iraq c'entrava con l'11 settembre come i cavoli a merenda : ma forse alla Casa Bianca non sanno mangiare).
C'è gente a Baghdad che si fa tatuare il corpo con nome cognome ed indirizzo perchè da quelle parti, quando si muore, capita spesso di finire a pezzi (coi confini aperti e disarmato dagli anglo-americani del proprio esercito l'Iraq è diventato ricettacolo di tutti e di tutto).
I cristiani per la prima volta dopo 14 secoli di pacifica convivenza con i fratelli mussulmani e 2000 anni di presenza corrono serio rischio di sparire dall'Iraq (ed a questo contribuiscono non poco i missionari evangelicals al seguito delle truppe yankees).
E quel mentecatto di Bush è ancora lì. al suo posto, con la sua bibbia in una mano (ma non si capisce quale bibbia sia) e la pistola fumante nell'altra.

Ismaele

Che gli americani in Iraq (e non solo lì) abbiano perso ormai è pacifico. Il problema è che con loro ha perso l' intero popolo iracheno , un popolo nobile e di antiche tradizioni culturali , amante della pace e della pacifica convivenza tra culture diverse. Terribile è che ancora in America ed in Europa (Italia compresa) ci sia gente , con poco senso della realtà e della storia, che continua a lodare le sorti magnifiche e progressive della democrazia di esportazione made in USA-Israele.

Yusuf